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Abstract: 
Special legislation associated with mega sporting events has enabled new forms of 
cultural enclosure, effectively commoditising aspects of cultural expression that 
previously remained in the public domain. In this paper, the authors examine the 
tension between economic and political justifications for hosting the Olympics and the 
intellectual property enclosures that are imposed upon host nations. These enclosures 
extend beyond what is traditionally protected under trade mark law, to include 
ÔgenericÕ terms.  Enabling market competitors to freely use generic, descriptive 
language is a core doctrine of trade mark law, seeking to balance monopoly IP rights 
with free market competition.  The authors evaluate the impact of special legislative 
enclosures on the public interest, and argue that collective access to expression should 
be more carefully considered in political and economic calculations of the value of the 
Olympics.  
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Controversy over the value of hosting mega sporting events such as the 
Olympics has focused on whether public investment is justified or whether it 
represents an opportunity cost when expenditures elsewhere would better serve the 
public interest (Poynter, 2005; Baade & Matheson, 2004; De Nooij & Van den Berg, 
2013). Economic models applied ex-ante as justification for investment often depend 
on the concept of a Ômultiplier effectÕ which is expected to produce direct, indirect 
and induced stimuli at various points in the economy (Kasimati, 2003). Arguments by 
proponents of hosting the Olympics have based their claims in part on the expected 
economic benefits to local businesses and residents. However, added to 
considerations about the worth of Olympic host status to nationsÕ economic and 
social welfare should be the effect of new legislative techniques which impose limits 
on the use of language and imagery related to the sporting event, beyond what would 
be protectable by traditional intellectual property law.  Exceptional legislation limits 
commercial speech by local businesses and could be used to limit or censor unwanted 
expressions by other groups. As the Olympics and other mega sporting events have 
grown in importance as spectacular sites of symbolic capital exchange, the value of 
cultural signs and symbols related to the Games has increased. Efforts by Games 
organisers and sponsors to enclose and commoditise cultural expression through legal 
enclosures is consistent with intellectual property enclosure in other realms, but 
highlights a contradiction at the core of the modern Olympics movement: while the 
Olympics draws its strength from the participation of the public via expressions of 
patriotic nationalism, event organisers seek increasingly to exclude the public from 
access to the very same means of expression. 
 
A number of authors have highlighted the ways in which the aims of cultural 
preservation, protection or promotion can be impacted in contradictory ways by 
efforts to enclose cultural symbols as intellectual property.  Comaroff and Comaroff 
(2009) posit that efforts to commoditise local indigenous culture as a tourism ÔbrandÕ 
often has the perverse result of both materially preserving while simultaneously 
alienating creators from previous means of cultural production (2009:3).  Similarly 
the enclosure of culture may have alienating effects in other settings, such as that of 
athletic competition. Examining sporting mega events, Cho (2009) has suggested that 
spectacular events such as the Olympics play an important political role in promoting 
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social cohesion, through ritual consumption of national symbols, anthems and news 
content. Similarly, drawing on Anderson, Tzanelli (2006) has argued that symbolic 
cultural artifacts play an important role in self-narration of individual and national 
identity.   He argues that in the Euro 2004 football event, Greek identity in part drew 
upon Ônational symbols and collective memory.Õ (2006:484) These included symbols 
which resided in the Ôpublic domainÕ:  Hellenic mythological figures, classical 
architecture and sites, dress, cartographic imaginaries, flags and religious symbols.  
Paradoxically, however, the cultural expressions described by Cho and Tzanelli, 
through intellectual property enclosure, are either prohibited or are re-cast as a form 
of market consumption, rather than spontaneous expressions of sporting nationalism.  
For example, the twin mascots of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, Athena and 
Phevos, were closely modeled after Greek terra cotta statues from the 7th century BC.  
However, the resulting character designs were the protected trademarks of the Athens 
Olympic Organizing Committee (ATHOC) and used in commercial licensing and 
sponsorship around the Games event.  In this way, a symbol available to common 
uptake and reinterpretation by the public was forcibly removed from the cultural 
commons and exclusively propertised.  
 
Commenting in the lead-up to the 2012 London Olympics, James and Osborn 
(2011) characterised the on-going tension between the cultural importance of the 
Olympics and its commercialisation as an international media event: 
 
The Fundamental Principles of Olympism aim at, amongst other things, 
blending sport with culture and education, promoting a peaceful society 
and having respect for fundamental and universal ethical principles. 
[É] however, the ever-increasing costs of hosting the Games requires 
the local organising committee to maximise its commercial revenues in 
order to put on a spectacle of sufficient proportions to be considered to 
be a success by the IOC and the worldÕs media. (2011:4) 
 
Despite opposition by some lawmakers and legal scholars, the trend in special 
legislation has continued to evolve toward strict enclosures of generic words and 
images associated with mega events (see Table 1). The 2012 London Games 
represented the widest enclosure of words and symbols so far in the history of the 
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Olympics, including restrictions on combinations of words such as ÔsummerÕ Ô2012Õ 
and ÔmedalsÕ, terms which would not normally enjoy protection as trade marks.   
 
 
Table 1:  Words and phrases protected by special legislation since 2000 Olympics 
Items protected by 
legislation: 
Sydney 
2000 
Athens   
2004 
Beijing  
2008 
London 
2012 
Year + city name     
Year + ÔmedalsÕ     
Year + ÔsponsorÕ     
Year + ÔsummerÕ     
Year + Ôgold/silver/bronzeÕ     
ÔGamesÕ + city name      
ÔGamesÕ + ÔmedalsÕ     
ÔGamesÕ + ÔsponsorÕ     
ÔGamesÕ + ÔsummerÕ     
ÔGamesÕ + Ôgold/silver/bronzeÕ     
ÔGamesÕ + year + variant     
ÔGamesÕ + Sequence number     
ÔGames CityÕ     
ÔOlympic~Õ + generic terms     
 
 
Event organisers have argued that the purpose of enacting event-specific 
legislation is to raise capital needed to  stage the events by offering greater protection 
to sponsors. Indeed, the London Games reportedly raised over £1.4 billion from 
sponsors who paid to have their brands displayed throughout the Olympic venue, as 
well as for rights to use official logos, words and imagery in advertisements (Rogers, 
2012).  However, the total cost of the London Games was officially stated to be in 
excess of £8.9 billion (Gibson, 2012). 
 
The benefits to commercial sponsors and event organisers are potentially in 
tension with the public interest both economically and politically. National 
governments must justify public investment in mega sporting events to their political 
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constituents. However, the true economic impact of a mega sporting event on a host 
country remains hotly debated, with no clear consensus on the net value of such an 
investment, nor on the appropriate method to empirically evaluate impact (Longdin, 
2009; de Nooij & van den Berg, 2013).  Consensus about the reputational effects of 
place-marketing associated with media coverage of the host city or nation is similarly 
limited. Certainly, the enclosure of symbolic capital constituted by words and images 
associated with an event runs contrary to the economic rationale that local and 
national businesses will be able to fully benefit from a Ôtrickle-downÕ effect, since 
Olympics sponsorship attracts global brands seeking to reach an international 
audience. 
 
The enclosure approach represented by special legislation has attracted 
criticism from legal scholars for overstretching the boundaries of intellectual property 
law, prejudicially tipping the balance of economic incentivisation vs. public interest 
that is foundational to European and American IP regimes. Longdin (2009) 
characterises intellectual property regulation as needing to Ôstrike a balance between 
the need to encourage innovation and creativity and discourage consumer deception 
through the granting of temporary and limited legal monopolies and the potentially 
adverse effect on the wider economy that such monopolies can entail.Õ From the 
perspective of public good, Corbett and Roy (2010) argue that additional enclosures 
Ôpay little heed to the careful balancing between the public good and private rights 
which underpins these traditional intellectual property laws.Õ Arguably, special 
legislative enclosures such as the 2006 London Games Act have bypassed the 
balancing act performed by national IP laws by not fully weighing potential effects 
on wider society.   Inconsistencies in the purpose of special legislation may weaken 
the legitimacy of intellectual property regulation when viewed by the public to run 
contrary to the aims of promoting creation and dissemination of new ideas and 
contributing to economic growth. 
 
In this paper, we consider whether special legislation such as the 2006 Act 
should be understood in relation to existing theory on intellectual property enclosure. 
We identify the features of the 2006 Act which set it apart from established trade 
mark law, and examine potential impact of those changes on the public interest. 
Finally, the paper concludes by arguing that neither the public interest nor the 
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interests of event organisers are secured by overly restrictive intellectual property 
enclosure.  Rather a recognition of the co-constructed nature of cultural meaning is 
more consistent with the way that audiences, consumers, and publics engage with 
mega sporting events and the brands associated with them. 
 
 
A second enclosure movement? 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, numerous legal theorists have argued that a 
recent expansion of intellectual property rights should be likened in its effect to the 
enclosure of common land that took place in England between the sixteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries (Benkler, 1999; Boyle, 2003, 2009; Rose, 2003; Cohen, 2012).  
The argument has been forcefully made in the case of copyright law by Benkler 
(1999) but the issue has also drawn attention in the domains of trade mark and patent, 
notably in the life sciences (Heller, 2013; Torrance, 2013).  
 
According to Benkler (1999) a series of legal innovations that have appeared 
since the 1980s herald a problematic new direction for intellectual property rights, 
one which puts copyright in direct conflict with the right to freedom of speech, 
constitutionally protected in the United States by the First Amendment.  These legal 
innovations included provisions for digital protection measures included in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, new protection of compilations of facts contained 
in databases, and the contractual override of fair use provisions heralded by Ôclick-
wrapÕ licensing. While copyright law has sought to mitigate against negative effects 
introduced by the granting of a monopoly right to owners through fundamental 
concepts such as the idea/expression dichotomy, these new legal instruments upset 
the balance struck by earlier intellectual property law. For Benkler, the existence of 
the public domain Ð uses of information to which all members of the public are 
equally privileged Ð is in tension with what he terms the Ôenclosed domainÕ of uses 
which the law prevents without the ownerÕs permission.  Enclosure describes the 
process of re-drawing the line between these two mutually-exclusive domains:   
 
Given these symmetric definitions [of the public domain], "enclosure" 
means a change in law that requires government, upon the request of a 
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person designated as a right holder, to prevent some uses or 
communications of information that were privileged to all prior to the 
change. An "enclosure" moves some uses and communications 
previously in the public domain into the enclosed domain.  (Benkler, 
1999: 363) 
Boyle (2003) has carried forward work by Benkler and others to argue that the 
combined effect of new legislative protections on intellectual property across a range 
of domains constitutes not just a movement of certain goods into private hands, but a 
re-conceptualisation of the meaning of property. In this way, Ô[t]hings that were 
previously thought to be either common property or uncommodifiable are being 
covered in new or extended intellectual property rights.Õ (2003: 37). According to 
Boyle, expansionist arguments in favour of extending intellectual property rights 
echo those that supported the privatisation of property in the first enclosure 
movement. Namely, that in order to overcome the Ôtragedy of the commonsÕ, 
inefficiently managed land should be transferred to the hands of a single owner, who 
will be incentivised to improve and tend the property.  Selfish overgrazing will be 
replaced with longer term planning, resulting in an overall increase in productivity at 
the expense of increased inequality in the distribution of resources. 
 
On the other hand, potential harms resulting from enclosure, both physical and 
intangible, historically included violence, dislocation, disruption of traditional social 
relations, and a changed view of the link between self and environment (Boyle, 2003: 
35). To that list Benkler (1999) adds the possibility that enclosure of intellectual 
property concentrates the production of information among fewer actors, to the 
detriment of political diversity. Boyle (2003) suggests that intellectual property 
enclosure creates perverse incentives on the part of information owners to politically 
mobilise in pursuit of protection of their new right. Further, intellectual property 
rights might be exercised improperly to censor or manipulate culture and cultural 
tastes; for example heirs of a famous author choosing to prevent adaptations and 
other uses seen to tarnish the original work.  Discussing medical patents, Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998) argued that enclosure may actually invert the economic rationales 
provided to justify privatisation in the first place in what they refer to as the Ôtragedy 
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of the anti-commonsÕ, a reduction of innovation brought about by the increased 
transaction costs imposed by proliferating private rights.  
    
Critiques of the second enclosure movement concept have argued that drawing 
equivalences with the historical appropriation of real property is misleading or 
incomplete (Bowrey & Fowell, 2009). It is true that intellectual property differs from 
real property such as land in a number of important respects.  Unlike physical 
property, intellectual property is non-rivalrous: oneÕs use of the good does not 
deprive another of that use. Secondly, with the advent of the global information 
society, intellectual property is increasingly non-excludable, meaning that it is very 
difficult to prevent anotherÕs unauthorised use of the good as could be done with 
access controls on physical property (Rose, 2003).  Both Boyle and Rose 
acknowledge that intellectual property possesses these unique features, but they 
suggest that technological growth of the global communication network combined 
with the intangibility of IP is what is driving rights owners to seek greater protection:    
 
Transportation improvements in the early modern period integrated 
England into a more unified market; [É] Similarly today, the greater 
opportunities for copying and disseminating via the InternetÑthe new res 
publicaeÑmay well have engendered the new efforts towards Òenclosure.Ó 
(Rose, 2003: 101) 
 
It is not just the rapidity of communication enabled by digitalisation that has 
prompted efforts to enclose cultural ideas. The advance of intellectual property 
protection and the commoditisation of culture maps with transformations in global 
capitalism. A political economy approach to intellectual property enclosure 
conceptualizes the economic incentive of rightsholders to demand further protection 
as corresponding to a shift from material to symbolic production in the information 
economy (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996; May, 2014).  The increased proportion of 
wealth that is constituted by intangible property necessitates legal frameworks to 
commercialise cultural ideas and legitimate their trade. If, in 1978, some 80% of the 
market value of Fortune 500 firms was comprised of tangible assets and 20% 
intangibles, today the scales have tipped in the opposite direction, with 80% of the 
market valuation of large firms comprised of intangible assets, including trade marks 
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and patents (Jolly, 2007; Brassell & King, 2013: 25). The status of the Olympics as a 
cultural phenomenon has been no less influenced by the shift toward what Guy 
Debord termed the ÔspectacularÕ commoditisation of contemporary life. 
Consequently, if the logic of intellectual property enclosure holds in the realm of 
international sporting events, we should not be surprised to observe the continuing 
trend toward granting exclusive property rights around these commercially valuable 
sites of cultural exchange. 
 
In the next section, we outline the contours of existing trade mark law, and 
identify the points of divergence between its limited right and the new rights granted 
by special legislation including the London Games Act 2006. We argue that the 
special legislation enacted in the UK does constitute an enclosure according to the 
definition provided by legal scholars, in that it moves expression previously in the 
public domain into the enclosed domain. 
 
 
Trade mark and special legislation 
 
Trade mark law grants exclusive rights to use a mark in relation to a product or 
service. The mark designates the source of a good, and consequently must be unique, 
avoiding confusion with other competing goods or services in a specific market. 
Trade mark is territorial, meaning that it is granted in a specific jurisdiction, and it 
protects a mark only in the class of goods in which the trader does business.  For 
example, separate trade marks may be granted to Apple computer and Apple graphic 
design, as long as the marks are not applied to goods in the same class.  Trade marks 
must be registered (in the UK with the Intellectual Property Office) and if granted, 
enjoy protection for a term of 10 years, which is renewable.  
 
As with other intellectual property rights such as patent and copyright, 
lawmakers have circumscribed the rights granted by trade mark in order to strike a 
balance between the monopoly right of the mark owner and the interests of the 
public. In copyright and patent law, this balance is achieved partly by limiting the 
term of protection so that after a period of time, inventions and creative works enter 
the public domain, where they may be used freely as the basis for new creations.  
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Trade mark, if renewed, may last in perpetuity, so the exclusivity of the right is 
balanced instead by limiting the scope of the right to protecting only certain types of 
marks for specific classes of goods. 
 
A foundational limitation imposed on trade mark has been that marks must be 
distinctive and not generic.  Common words may sometimes be used as trade marks 
provided that their use is arbitrary, meaning that they bear no relation to the market or 
goods supplied (for example, ÔOrangeÕ for a mobile phone operator). The rationale 
for this limitation is that if generic words or symbols are monopolised by one single 
mark owner, it will limit the ability of competitors to market similar goods and 
services that can be described using the same generic language. For example, in the 
case of British Sugar PLC v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd., 1996, the plaintiff sued 
for infringement of the word ÔtreatÕ, which the company had registered in relation to a 
range of sugary desert sauces.  In reviewing the case, Justice Jacob found in favour of 
Robertson, on the basis that the word ÔtreatÕ was generic and therefore that the mark 
registered by British Sugar was invalid.  In his decision, Jacobs cited from a similar 
finding in an early twentieth century case the observation that, ÔWealthy traders are 
habitually eager to enclose part of the great common of the English language and to 
exclude the general public of the present day and of the future from access to the 
enclosure.Õ
3
 Recently, trade mark has been interpreted in Europe to extend to 
protection of brand investment, although not without controversy. In LÕOreal v 
Bellure, 2009, LÕOreal brought proceedings against Bellure on the grounds that 
BellureÕs low-cost perfumes harmed LÕOrealÕs business by generating confusion and 
that Bellure was free riding on the LÕOreal brand by issuing price comparison lists 
that showed the two perfumes side by side (Chen 2010).  Although a UK Court of 
Appeals upheld the ECJ finding of trade mark infringement, the court criticized the 
ECJ decision for granting protection to the ÔbrandÕ investment of LÕOreal to the 
detriment of free expression (in this case the transmission of descriptive information 
about a product to consumers).  These two cases illustrate that the creation of a 
monopoly right by grant of a trade mark is not taken lightly by the courts; while 
determinations about the extent of protection enjoyed by a trade mark owner vary by 
                                                        
3
 Joseph Crosfield & Son's Appn ("Perfection") (1909) 26 RPC 837 at page 854. 
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case, limits to the right are always acknowledged as a counterbalance to ownersÕ 
rights.  
 
In the case of sporting events, a number of prominent disputes have centred on 
the use of generic words and symbols.  In S.F. Arts & Athletics, 1987, The US 
Supreme Court upheld that the petitioner had infringed the right of the USOC to the 
word ÔOlympicÕ and various Olympic symbols under the Amateur Sports Act, 1978
4
. 
San Francisco Arts and Athletics had sought to organise a ÔGay Olympic GamesÕ 
event and had used the symbols in advertising and mailings.  The group argued that 
the prohibition on use of the word ÔOlympicÕ was unconstitutional and that the First 
Amendment prevented Congress from lawfully granting a trade mark in the word. 
The US Court of Appeals found that the exclusive use granted by the Amateur Sports 
Act was not equivalent to a simple trade mark. The USOC was awarded an injunction 
to prevent the unauthorised use of the symbol, in the first widely publicised 
application of special legislation to protect Olympic symbols.  
 
In Europe, challenges to the trade mark protection of generic sports-related 
language have succeeded.  In Ferrero v FIFA, the sweets manufacturer Ferrero 
challenged FIFA over the registration of the mark ÔWORLD CUP 2006Õ in Germany 
because it was a descriptively used for sports events
5
. OHIM decided in favour of 
Ferrero that such mark was not capable of registration as a Community trade mark 
since it was only a generic description of a type of competition and was not restricted 
solely to the competition organised by FIFA unless combined with another element 
like the name of the organiser or a main sponsor.  
 
The new tool of special legislation has enabled the IOC and events organisers to 
overcome limits in trade mark law and gain protection for generic and descriptive 
terms. The words ÔLondonÕ and Ô2012Õ are similar in distinctiveness to the example 
of ÔWorld Cup 2006Õ, however the London Olympic Games organisers sidestepped 
any limitation in trade mark law and acquired the extended protection via the London 
Games Act 2006.  
                                                        
4
 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) 
 
5
 Bundesgerichtshof, I. Zivilsenat , I ZR 183/07 "WM-Marken" 
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The London Games Act 2006 protected two broad categories of words and 
symbols. The first category were the words and symbols which are trade marks or 
function in the manner of trade marks to indicate origin of the Games and the entities 
responsible for organising the event.  This category included the words ÔOlympicÕ, 
ÔOlympiadÕ, and the Olympic motto, as well as the emblems and signs of the IOC.  In 
addition, the category covers the names of the entities which were established to 
deliver the games such as LOCOG (London Organising Committee for Olympic 
Games) and the mascots, slogans and certain terms created by such entities (such as 
Ôshare for spiritÕ created by SOCOG for Sydney Olympics). The trade mark 
protection of this category arguably pre-exists the enactment of event-specific 
legislation in the host country and consequently does not encroach further upon the 
public domain. 
 
The second category of words and symbols protected by the 2006 Act included 
the addition of additional generic words related to the sporting event, such as the 
colours ÔgoldÕ and ÔsilverÕ. It also consisted of generic words and symbols describing 
the milieu surrounding the event, such as ÔLondon 2012, Games CityÕ (see table 2). 
The Act prohibited the commercial use of any combination of two words from list A 
and B, or any two words from List A. The use of these words or symbols would not 
normally be protected under existing trade mark law in any of the jurisdictions 
concerned.  
  
Table 2: Words and symbols protected by London Games Act 2006 
 
List A List B 
 
 
Games 
Two Thousand and Twelve 
2012 
Twenty Twelve 
 
 
Gold 
Silver 
Bronze 
London 
medals 
sponsor 
summer 
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By enclosing generic language surrounding the Olympic event, the IOC and 
organisers sought to reduce the ability of non-sponsor businesses and individuals 
from making any commercial association with the international event.  This legal 
enclosure moves beyond not only what is normally permitted in trade mark law 
(distinctive or arbitrary terms used in the course of trade) but arguably extends the 
definition and role of trade mark to dissuade not only efforts to confuse or deceive 
consumers, but any effort to associate oneÕs product or service with the public 
goodwill surrounding the events. 
 
Although the scope of trade mark law has expanded over time to include 
protection against ÔdilutionÕ of marks, some legal scholars have argued that the 
purpose of trade marks should remain focused on preventing confusion in the course 
of trade, and should not be further broadened to protect the reputation or goodwill 
surrounding a mark. Drawing from Ralph BrownÕs (1949) analysis of early trade 
mark law, Jessica Litman (1999) argues that Ôlegal protection for trade symbols, in 
the absence of confusion, disserves competition and thus the consumer. It arrogates to 
the producer the entire value of cultural icons that we should more appropriately treat 
as collectively owned.Õ (1999:1718). The information function of trade marks serves 
the public interest, Litman argues, because it prevents sellers from engaging in 
deception about the source of goods, whilst enabling competition between sellers 
with different marks. However when trade mark protection is widened to include the 
goodwill or reputation surrounding the mark itself, this results in the removal of 
words and symbols from the public domain because the mark owner can police its 
further use in markets not related to the original goods.  The removal of words and 
symbols from the public domain is precisely what we observe occurring via the 
mechanism of special legislation: the IOC and organisers wish not only to prevent 
confusion about the origin of the games and sponsorship status, but also to prevent 
mere association with the athletic competition itself Ð a broad and generic set of 
concepts and ideas. 
 
The approach proposed by Litman is to limit the scope of protection granted by 
trade marks in recognition that brand goodwill is co-constructed by audiences and 
consumers and is therefore not solely the property of the markÕs user. The reputation, 
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or ÔatmosphericsÕ which surround a brand are themselves a product. And if 
lawmakers wish to promote competition in the marketplace of ideas, Litman suggests 
that over-protection of those ideas is a misguided response:  
 
The argument that trade symbols acquire intrinsic value Ð apart from 
their usefulness in designating the source Ð derives from consumersÕ 
investing those symbols with value for which they are willing to pay 
real money. [É] If the thing itself is valuable, if it is in some sense 
itself a product, then we want other purveyors to compete in offering it 
to consumers in their own forms and on their own terms. (1999: 1734).  
 
LitmanÕs observations have proven prescient since, in the years following, the media 
itself has enthusiastically adopted characteristics of interconnectivity and co-
production. More than ever, through digital networks which enable user-generated 
content and audience contribution, brand value is inseparable from the 
communicative activities of consumers.  Organisers of spectacular, global, televised 
events now seek ways to make their programmes more engaging and more 
ÔspreadableÕ (Ytreberg, 2009; Jenkins et al, 2013). Hosting an Olympic competition 
in the era of digital media may necessarily mean relinquishing some measure of 
control over intellectual property to spectators and fans, whose collective engagement 
with the spectacle facilitates its circulation via participatory culture (Green & 
Erickson, 2014).  
 
Conclusion: the impact of enclosure on the public interest 
 
The citizenry of the Olympic host nation is impacted by special legislation even 
though the commitment to enact such legislation occurs during the bidding process 
when there is limited public oversight or input (Scassa, 2012).  The host nation public 
is potentially impacted by special legislation in two ways.  First, rules imposed by 
event organisers impose costs disproportionately on smaller local businesses which, 
according to commonly applied economic models of the potential benefits of hosting 
the Olympics, are the most likely to directly benefit from ÔmultiplierÕ effects as 
visitors and consumers spend money in the local economy.  Paradoxically, any 
chilling effect produced by special legislation is likely to be most strongly apparent 
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among smaller businesses which lack the marketing nous and legal understanding 
required to edge close to, without infringing, the labyrinthine set of regulations 
imposed (Scassa, 2012).  On the other hand, large multinational brands, wishing to 
generate associations with an Olympic event, can apply a range of creative 
approaches for doing so without directly speaking about the Games.  For example, 
during the 2012 event, non-sponsor UK company Marks and Spencer ran a major 
print advertising campaign using the strapline ÔOn your MarksÕ which portrayed 
revelers engaging in a variety of garden party games, the scene framed with patriotic 
colors and flag pendants.  None of the words or images used in the advertisement 
directly infringed the London Games Act, but the overall impression generated by the 
combination of elements was an association with the cultural context of the Games.  
The campaign required creative skill and legal expertise that may be inaccessible to 
smaller firms, while the subtle association prompted by the advertisement may not 
have been suitable for those businesses directly engaged with customers, for example 
in the service or leisure industries.  
 
Second, the public interest is potentially harmed by overly restrictive special 
legislation because it may impose a chilling effect on both commercial and non-
commercial speech beyond the Games themselves.  Granting exclusive protection for 
generic terms such as ÔsummerÕ Ô2012Õ and ÔLondonÕ raised challenges for non-
sponsor advertisers while its usefulness to protect the investment of major brand 
sponsors is questionable.  Importantly, the Olympics were not the only event which 
occurred in London during the summer of 2012:  advertisers wishing to associate 
themselves with the QueenÕs Diamond Jubilee or even the British summertime itself 
would have been discouraged from doing so by the broad reach of the 2006 Games 
Act. Non-commercial speech was also potentially restricted by the special legislation. 
The Act permitted ÔfactualÕ reference to the Games in non-commercial settings, but 
covered a broad range of communication, Ôwholly or partly for the purpose of 
promotion, advertisement, announcement or directionÕ.  The IOC issued guidelines 
discouraging use of the protected phrases by journalists, conference organisers, 
charities, and not-for-profit groups.  Enforceable or implied restrictions upon non-
commercial or quasi-commercial users could have the effect of dampening criticism 
of the Olympics or preventing wider engagement by minority groups in media 
conversations.  
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The upcoming 2016 Olympic Games in Rio will be accompanied by 
extraordinarily restrictive special legislation that continues the trend of intellectual 
property enclosure established by the London Games. In its published guidelines, the 
Rio 2016 Organising Committee has claimed restrictions on the use of associative 
words and imagery, use for political purposes (ÔpropagandaÕ), website domain 
registration, placement of online advertisements and the creation of fan-made 
countdown clocks (Omega is the official timekeeper of the 2016 Games). These 
intellectual property enclosures are particularly impactful because they will occur in 
the context of an ÔemergingÕ economy which faces challenging levels of social and 
economic inequality. The published guidelines insist that ÔPassion and transformation 
are ever-present in the essence of the official brands. [É] Passion that unites all 
Brazilians in organising the Games. Transformation in the creation of a new reality 
for progress.Õ (Rio OCOG 2014: 18). However, when special legislation is used to 
upset the balance of intellectual property law to grant exclusive use of common 
culture and ideas, the ability of society to transform the Olympics into an engine of 
progress is cast into doubt.  
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